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Introduction 
 
On August 6, 1971 a group of men and women sat down to dinner in the capital 
of Chile. In attendance was a “[a] mild, friendly, narrow-gauged military man” whose 
mysteriousness prompted Santiago Station to cable CIA headquarters after the meal.1 
Ironically, it was the “quiet and cautious” man who had attracted the CIA’s attention. 
He “avoided making comments that would reveal his inner thoughts...he is not a 
ceremonial figure…clearly enjoyed [the] feeling of being important...person who could 
possibly be neutralized by conspiratorial group but who would not lead any coup.”2 
Two years later, this mysterious man Augusto Pinochet launched a coup d’état that 
initiated 17 years of repressive rule and ultimately came to transform the foundations of 
Chilean democracy. He replaced democratically elected president Salvador Allende 
with the backing of a military junta composed of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, 
and the National Police. United States involvement was critical because its leadership 
began plotting to intervene in Chile before Allende was ever elected, and before 
Pinochet himself ever entered their radar. Pinochet owed his ability to overthrow 
Allende to US executive powers and intelligence, whose covert operations generated the 
widespread panic throughout Chile that made the coup so opportune.3 
This investigation argues that Pinochet strategically adjusted the intensity of his 
repression and changed diplomatic tactics toward the US government in order to 
manage his power and legitimacy. This study focuses on two periods: 1973-74 and 
                                               
1 Santiago Station was the base with which the CIA communicated in the capital of Chile. 
2 CIA Report, “Dinner with Augusto Pinochet,” August 6, 1971. 
3 This study will refer to the US executive as an umbrella term to include the White House, Department of 
State, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Though the last agency 
functioned separately from the US government, it remained in close contact and received direct 
authorization from President Richard Nixon during this period. 
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1975-80. During the first, Pinochet achieved most of his original goals. The peak of 
Pinochet’s violence unfolded during the first two years of his rule (1973-74), during 
which his secret police forcefully detained, tortured, assassinated, and disappeared mass 
numbers of political rivals and civilian dissenters. The result was a climate of fear that 
subdued the majority of society into compliance, silenced organized opposition groups, 
and exiled tens of thousands. Pinochet largely owed the success of his initial goals to a 
ready US executive commitment, which quietly sent loads of arms, funding for the 
military, and intelligence resources for regime consolidation.4 However, these relational 
dynamics made Pinochet dependent on a US government that after 1974, was no longer 
willing to show him open support. 
By the second period (1975-80), Pinochet had by and large achieved within 
Chile the original objectives he had declared upon the coup. However, external 
dynamics were changing as the world became progressively more aware of the illicit 
operations and vehemently challenged his authority. Three critical factors that brought 
negative publicity and created tensions in Pinochet’s power were: US Congressional 
investigations of CIA collaboration with the junta (1975-76), the Chilean intelligence’s 
assassination of Ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington (1976), and the election of 
Jimmy Carter as president (1977). Even though Pinochet reduced repression after 
having marginalized domestic resistance and attempting to appease international 
censure, these events and processes unrelentingly threatened to delegitimize his right to 
rule. These turning points unfolded in close succession to the effect of inverting the 
Cold War equilibrium that had reinforced Pinochet’s authority in the earlier period. 
                                               
4 Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: 
New Press, 2003. 
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Though the US had helped Pinochet to justify the “temporary” subordination of 
freedom and human rights to anti-communism immediately after the coup, this was no 
longer true by the end of the decade. Instead, the US and international critics pushed 
Pinochet to subject his anti-communism pursuits to freedom and human rights. These 
new conditions for democratization threatened to delegitimize his government. Pinochet 
adapted to these developments by shifting his strategies from repressive persecution and 
elimination of opposition to politicization and institutionalization of his regime. This 
narrative explores how Western influences and formal international entities reevaluated 
freedom and human rights, which was detrimental to Pinochet’s ability to persuade the 
world of his legitimacy. 
 
Methodology 
In order to understand how General Pinochet strategized to strengthen his 
international legitimacy, this study examines his relationship with voices of influence 
such as diplomatic authorities and Western journalists. This investigation concentrates 
on Pinochet’s relationships with the US executive, allied governments, non-state actors 
such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and the foreign 
press. This study analyzes how Pinochet crafted his image in front of foreign entities 
through discourse, tactics of repression, and manipulation of his alliance with the US. 
The claims made in this study derive from a variety of historical documents 
from both Chile and the US. One important collection of evidence is the National 
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Security Archives, which set in motion the Chile Documentation Project in 2000.5 
These US government documents expose the once covert pursuits of the US executive 
in several countries including Chile, and reveal many of Pinochet’s motivations even 
though most relevant Chilean records remain classified or inaccessible to the public.6 
Though Chilean domestic forces shaped the General’s decisions without a doubt, these 
factors remain beyond the scope of this investigation, because records of internal 
communications within the junta and information are unavailable to date. This author 
hopes that future archival research will be able to illuminate these dynamics. 
One of the goals of this thesis is to examine the process by which Pinochet 
attempted to establish his political standing in the world during his first seven years. 
Some sources that contribute to these understandings are presidential speeches, Chilean 
government sponsored propaganda, the diary of the army commander who preceded 
Pinochet, and correspondences between Pinochet and Carter. Another significant source 
that contains words coming directly from Pinochet are the rare televised interviews that 
he granted. Foreign journalists, not Chilean, conducted nearly all of the interviews that 
have been preserved to the present day. As to US public opinion, this study capitalizes 
on New York Times archives as descriptions of the dialogue that informed the US 
public opinion. This news source holds historical value, since it resonates values that 
challenged and conflicted with the US executive’s operations abroad. 
A final note which the reader should also take into consideration is that the 
author of this study has personally translated all sources which were originally only 
                                               
5 Since 2000, over 16,000 US government documents on Chile have been declassified. 
Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: 
New Press, 2003. 
6 The military still holds records that even the current Chilean government cannot access...and most Chile 
documents that are publicly accessible are not yet digitized, but remain in the National Library in 
Santiago. 
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available in Spanish. This excludes citations from scholars and authors who have 
conducted translation work themselves. 
 
Contribution to the Field 
Much of the scholarly work in the field of Chilean history has concentrated on 
explaining the effects of the junta’s economic decisions and human rights violations on 
society, but have not yet contextualized it extensively in the realm of international 
relations. Not only did Pinochet prioritize political stability, social order, and economic 
growth, but he was also concerned about the legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of 
Chileans and the international community. Until the release of most US government 
documents in the 2000s, little evidence was available to measure the significance of US 
complicity and criticism to the survival of the junta. Chile historians have analyzed how 
Pinochet’s government became destabilized and was eventually voted out near the end 
of the 1980s. However, scholars have written little on how external pressures 
undermined Pinochet’s regime as early as the mid-1970s, and how he reconfigured the 
political structures of governance to stay in power. This study therefore analyzes 
Pinochet’s legitimization processes as two distinct eras during this decade in the context 
of fluctuating international conditions. This investigation attempts to explain the ways 
human rights as a force pushed and pulled on Pinochet’s regime, and induced the 
General to compromise certain goals and strategies in order to secure his legitimacy. 
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Conceptualizing Political Legitimacy 
This study makes no normative claims on the notion of legitimacy, but draws on 
the theory of philosopher Jean Hampton as a helpful framework for understanding the 
idea of legitimacy pertinent to Pinochet’s case in the 1970s. Hampton asserts that 
political authority “is invented by a group of people who perceive that this kind of 
special authority is necessary for the collective solution of certain problems of 
interaction in their territory and whose process of state creation essentially involves 
designing the content and structure of that authority so that it meets what they take to be 
their needs.”7 This definition is relevant to Pinochet’s regime during this timeframe, 
because he executed the coup claiming the right to temporarily rule in Chile by 
promising to “solve” the Marxist problem. He accused Allende of being a tyrant, and 
subsequently detained, assassinated, and disappeared those whom he accused of having 
subverted the democratic foundation of Chile. In the second period, Pinochet largely 
formed his State-building strategies around individual economic rights more than 
collective rights; however, he continually felt the need to validate his laws and policies 
as the framework of a legitimate democratic Constitution. 
Another aspect of Hampton’s notion of legitimacy that is relevant to Pinochet 
was his posture of entitlement to use coercion. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy: 
Her [Hapmton’s] theory links the authority of the state to its ability to 
enforce a solution to coordination and cooperation problems. Coercion is 
the necessary feature that enables the state to provide an effective 
solution to these problems, and the entitlement to use coercion is what 
constitutes the authority of the state. The entitlement to use coercion 
                                               
7  Hampton, Jean. Political Philosophy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. 77. 
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distinguishes such minimally legitimate political authority from a mere 
use of power.8 
 
Pinochet only admitted his use of coercion in the context of constant state of siege or 
emergency, which he repeatedly enacted through 1980. He never surrendered his 
discourse that communist forces endangered the societal order, and when questioned for 
committing excesses, he accused communists – always armed – for propelling the 
country to the verge of civil war. Pinochet’s discourse always demonstrated an attitude 
of protective and loyal regard for democratic law.  
                                               
8  "Political Legitimacy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 2010. 
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Historical Background 
In 1810, British colonist Bernardo O’Higgins led Chile to achieve independence 
from Spanish colonial rule. From that point until the 1970s, Chile was a beacon of 
stability and democracy in the Latin American continent.9 The US hastened to stamp its 
influence in Chile as early as 1811 during the War of Independence and the War of the 
Pacific (1879-1883). As the twentieth century unfolded, Chilean politics developed into 
a tripolar multi-party system developed to encompass right, center, and left coalitions. 
These consisted of political parties that were fragmented, but flexible and competitive. 
Eventually these coalitions consolidated their politics into three identifiable parties, 
respectively: the National Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Popular Unity 
(UP). However, as the effects of the Cold War infiltrated the country’s borders, the 
parties divided even more sharply along ideological lines. 
Revolutionary sentiments had already taken root in the attitudes of politically 
active citizens before the Chilean situation came to alarm the US government in the 
sixties.10 President Richard Nixon observed the events in Chile with the apprehension 
that Allende’s advance toward communism would give hope to Latin American leftist 
agitators who had been mobilizing with zeal after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. They 
claimed Allende’s victory to be a revolution of a new kind, and Nixon feared that Cuba-
style sanctions and embargoes would fail to prevent Chile from converting into a 
                                               
9 The one exception was Carlos Ibañez del Campo, a single dictator who briefly paused Chile’s 
democratic tradition from 1927-1931 and 1952 to 1958. 
10 The Revolutionary Left Movement, a far-left guerilla party, was founded in 1965. The Socialist Party 
of Chile was notably active in the 1950s in municipal elections. See The Pinochet File for further 
evidence of revolutionary thought preceding Allende’s election. 
  
 
9 
completely and permanently communist State.11 However, Nixon believed that if he 
could prevent Chile from becoming “another Cuba,” the US could “throw the blanket” 
on the Cuba effect of revolutionary fervor in Latin America.12 
As the 1970 Chilean presidential elections approached, President Nixon 
recognized that elected communism would endanger the US Cold War campaign 
against the “militant aggressiveness” of international communism. In his 1960 
presidential election campaign, then Vice President Richard Nixon gave a speech 
entitled The Meaning of Communism to Americans: 
The question is not one of being for or against communism. The time is 
long past when any significant number of Americans contend that 
communism is no particular concern of theirs. Few can still believe that 
communism is simply a curious and twisted philosophy which happens 
to appeal to a certain number of zealots but which constitutes no serious 
threat to the interests or ideals of free society…We recognize that we 
must retain our present military and economic advantage over the 
Communist bloc…It would be comforting to believe that the forces of 
history are working inevitably toward this realization and that we too are 
cooperating with the inevitable….But we can know that the forces of 
human life, struggling to realize itself on its highest plane, are working 
with us and that those forces need our help desperately.13 
 
Nixon recognized that the philosophies put forth by leftist activists were sophisticated 
and appealing to large numbers in free societies. He argued, however, that communism 
was oppressing many, and contended that when victims of oppression called, the US 
had to respond. 
Contrary to President Nixon’s wishes, communist and socialist sentiments 
experienced renewal in Chile as the 1970 election approached. In spite of vigorous CIA 
                                               
11 OVAL; March 5, 1971, June 11, 1971; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 
12 Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: 
New Press, 2003. 
13 "Nixon: The Meaning Of Communism To Americans." Watergateinfo. 21 Aug. 1960. Web. 28 Feb. 
2015. <http://watergate.info/1960/08/21/nixon-the-meaning-of-communism-to-americans.html>. 
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efforts to prevent the success of the Popular Unity, Salvador Allende was inaugurated as 
the new Chilean president on November 4, 1970.14 He won the election by a slim 
margin, precisely, 36.6% percent of the popular vote. To the poor, Allende was a 
symbol of hope. To radicals and revolutionaries, Allende’s victory was invigorating, for 
historically no socialist leader had yet taken up power peacefully and democratically. 
To the US government, Allende was a cause for panic. President Nixon feared that 
Spanish-speaking countries in the Southern hemisphere would follow suit in the wake 
of Castro’s victory. He said in an interview, “I remember months before Allende came 
to power in 1970[,] an Italian businessman came to call on me in the Oval Office and he 
said, ‘If Allende should win the election in Chile, and then you have Castro in Cuba, 
what you will in effect have in Latin America is a red sandwich, and eventually it will 
all be red.”15 What the Nixon administration most dreaded was the possibility that other 
regions would likewise choose socialism by their own political determination. 
Upon assuming office in Chile, Allende began promoting the radical idea that 
socialism was compatible with democracy. He set into motion an ambitious project 
called the Chilean Path to Socialism to turn the prevailing regime into a socialist State. 
He enforced rigorous land redistribution, nationalized copper, and enhanced public 
service programs such as healthcare and education. Many of Allende’s policies mirrored 
those of Castro, which compounded Nixon’s apprehensions that Chile’s socialist 
democracy would not be so democratic after all. Nixon said, “I believe in ‘dirty tricks.’ 
I think we’ve got to do it…if the Russians or the Chinese are in a particular little 
country trying to screw it up, we can screw it up too…we could have won the Chilean 
                                               
14 See Peter Kornbluh’s notes on CIA Track II activity. Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A 
Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: New Press, 2003, 14. 
15 "Excerpts from Nixon Interview on Chile." New York Times, May 26, 1977. Accessed May 15, 2015. 
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[election].”16 The key to the dirty tricks was to keep the face of the US government 
appearing innocent. Kissinger convinced Nixon that the merits of the non-overt course 
were, as Kornbluh describes, preventing Washington from being discredited among its 
European and Latin American allies, as well as to serve “‘Allende’s purpose of rallying 
the Chilean people around him in the face of the ‘foreign devil.’”17 
As Allende’s administration struggled to administer effective policies, Nixon 
saw that he could make Chile a prime example of the economic disaster that would 
strike countries that adopted communist orientations and shunned US influence. The 
hitch was that Allende was “elected legally and constitutionally. Therefore, he [had] 
legitimacy as far as Chileans and most of the world [was] concerned,” as Kissinger told 
the National Security Council. “[T]here is nothing we can do to deny him legitimacy or 
claim he does not have it as a tactic for weakening him. He is unlikely to move things 
along lines which would permit us easily to marshal international or hemisphere censure 
of him...We ourselves have traditionally espoused the principles of self-
determination...It would therefore be costly for us to act in ways that appear to violate 
those principles.”18 Among the subsequent actions authorized by the US government 
while “maintain[ing] an outwardly correct posture” were: the dumping of US copper 
holdings on the international market to cripple the copper price, drop Chile’s credit 
ratings with the Agency for International Development, and collaborate with the World 
Bank to disqualify Chile for loans in areas such as livestock-improvement.19 The Nixon 
                                               
16 OVAL; October 8, 1970; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, California. 
17 Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: 
New Press, 2003, 83. 
18 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 81. 
19 Copper was Chile’s main natural resource. Kissinger said about the proposal to dump copper on the 
global market: “It could be the most important thing we can do.” 
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administration’s policies aggravated the economic toil that Allende’s experimental 
economic policies initiated.  The country’s economy spiraled into hyperinflation and 
foreign investors withdrew and angrily demanded compensation. This disintegration 
rapidly deepened the social divisions and resentment in Chile. 
To enhance the effects of the economic warfare, the CIA served to compound 
the uncertainty and rancor against Allende. The CIA base in Santiago reported in a 
cable, “Carnage could be considerable and prolonged, i.e. civil war...You have asked us 
to provoke chaos in Chile...We provide you with a formula for chaos which is unlikely 
to be bloodless. To dissimulate the U.S. involvement will be clearly impossible.”20 
However, Nixon increasingly convinced himself that his economic attacks on Chile 
only accelerated the process of economic destabilization, which he asserted would have 
been inevitable under the Popular Unity government. To justify the effects of his 
policies, Nixon said, “They brought this on themselves; they’re ruining the Chilean 
economy with their expropriation and everything else. Now, for us to step in a rescue it, 
means that we are subsidizing, basically, the communization of Chile.”21 However, the 
Nixon administration realized that there were limits to its ability to use function 
covertly for ultimately violent ends. The CIA signaled to Nixon that even if he 
supported the narrative that the Armed Forces had prevented civil war, it would be 
difficult to justify, much less hide the backing of preemptive bloodshed. 
Throughout the course of these sweeping reforms, Chile’s political coalitions 
opposite the Popular Unity grew increasingly resentful and their antagonisms 
                                                                                                                                         
OVAL; November 6, 1970; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, California. 
20 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 1. 
21 OVAL; January 20, 1973; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, 
Yorba Linda, California. 
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exacerbated. Allende identified as an anti-imperialist, so Nixon realized that an ouster 
would only be legitimate if he could help draw Chile out of such anti-US sentiment. The 
Nixon administration recognized domestic interest in a coup in Chile, which presented 
the US an opportunity to redefine qualifications for politics. Nixon knew that 
dictatorships carried negative connotations, but he justified his endorsement of an 
authoritarian alternative to Allende’s socialist democracy, which he saw as a paradox.22 
On January 20, 1972 President Nixon expressed to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. 
Laird, “...the fiction is that if a government is based on any kind of military support, that 
it’s, by definition, thereby a bad government. And, of course, the truth is that sometimes 
it’s bad, sometimes it’s good. But, if a government is solely civilian, without military – 
if you look at the numbers and the present statistics – can many times be worse, and 
also one in which we have no influence. Right?” This rationalization let Nixon justify 
looking to the Chilean army for a sympathetic military leader who could potentially 
replace Allende.23 Ultimately, the Nixon administration’s policies were crucial to 
generating the demoralizing results in Chile that helped the Armed Forces justify an 
intervention to their country. 
The Popular Unity’s end came when social strife and desperation made even 
Allende’s supporters doubt whether the fulfillment of socialism in Chile was worth the 
cost of a failed economy. These tensions kept escalating until they culminated into a 
dramatic coup that Pinochet led on September 11, 1973. The dramatic violence of the 
                                               
22 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 81. 
23 The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs argued that in the case that Washington dishonor the democratic 
process, such audacity would: “Reduce our credibility throughout the world…increase nationalism 
directed at us…be used by the Allende Government to consolidate its position with the Chilean people 
and to gain influence in the rest of the hemisphere…and move the Allende Government to seek even 
closer relations with the USSR than it might have initially contemplated.” 
Ibid., 81. 
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bombardment of the presidential palace La Moneda and the break with loyalty were 
shocking developments to Chileans, since Allende had openly trusted General 
Pinochet.24 Prats wrote in his diary afterwards about how he had encouraged Allende to 
appoint Pinochet as commander-in-chief: “President Allende, upon accepting my 
resignation... asked of my opinion regarding Augusto Pinochet, as a successor for the 
position of chief commander...if I sustained any doubts regarding Pinochet’s loyalty. 
My response was: ‘No, President. I don’t have motives to advise you against the 
designation of General Pinochet as chief commander. I trust that he will know how to 
support you with the same loyalty that I have.’...” On his fatal day, President Allende 
chose to commit suicide as an act of defiance that symbolized socialism’s resistance to 
Western imperial influence. Many Chileans were not surprised at the succession of the 
coup. Prat’s wrote regretfully that Pinochet “will remain the great traitor of our 
history...the coup of the 11th of September has been only the beginning of a great 
collective tragedy.25 Most of the political left regarded Allende’s suicide as martyrdom, 
while many of the political right interpreted his suicide as surrender or defeat. With 
Chile waiting in shock and uncertainty, Pinochet presented himself as the savior of 
Allende’s depraved Chile.  
                                               
24 OVAL; September 21, 1973; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, 
Yorba Linda, California. 
25 Lez, Carlos. Diario Del General De Ejército Carlos Prats, Ex Comandante En Jefe Del Ejército 
Chileno. Buenos Aires: Editorial Fundamentos, 1984, 135. 
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Era of Confrontation (1973-1974) 
As soon as General Pinochet addressed the Chilean citizenry, he forewarned the 
people that a civil war was imminent, and would erupt should no authoritative force 
step forward to quell the disorder around Allende’s fallen regime. One group that 
represented this threat was the Revolutionary Left Movement. The party was a child of 
the New Left phenomenon that swept through Latin America and became radicalized 
under the leadership of Miguel Enríquez. Its militarism and loyalty to the Marxist-
Leninist model made the center and right coalitions feel that their power was threatened. 
Enríquez led the clandestine rebellion that spearheaded the popular resistance 
movement against General Pinochet, and thereby furthered his argument that there was 
a valid threat to peace and order in Chile. 
The coup was a miracle to some Chileans, and a tragedy to others. In order for 
Pinochet to meet his objectives of returning order to the country, he employed 
repressive tactics that prevented rebels from precipitating a domestic hot war. Pinochet 
adopted a defensive posture of national security and projected it out towards the Chilean 
populace in order to justify the repression that he knew would inevitably generate 
controversy. He sought to make his regime Chile’s symbol of hope, as he promised to 
found a new economy and a new democracy. 
The populace that received Pinochet’s junta was disillusioned with the previous 
administration, but suspicious of the new one. Pinochet had to prove that his purpose 
was worth having violated the Constitution. One of the ways he attempted to do this 
was by invalidating Allende and the effects of his policies. His regime would have more 
political leverage if he won over the left, but he took little time concluding that those 
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who demonstrated the most resistance would have to be weeded out through repression. 
Violence, after all, had to be justified. The utilitarian explanation would be that he made 
claims on the liberties of citizens who were interfering with his goals to accomplish 
peace, the restoration of democracy, and fight a menacing ideology. The evolution of 
his regime throughout the seventies demonstrates changes in the limits and conditions 
by which Pinochet was able to justify the use of force. 
General Pinochet commenced by portraying his regime as the guardian of a 
democracy that was under attack, asserting that opposing forces had to be met with 
force. The US government had likewise established its identity as the worldwide 
protector of democracy, and it lent Pinochet this prerogative. The agendas of the two 
administrations coincided particularly neatly upon the objective of eradicating Marxist, 
communist, and socialist influences in Chile.26 In October 1971, Nixon spoke to 
Secretary of the Treasury John Connally: 
...domestically the American people very much want the United States to 
stand up for its interests around the world. Second, the American people 
are fed to the teeth with international institutions, too; with multilateral 
organizations; political organizations like the U.N...third, the American 
people not only want us to take, but follow policies that keep us from 
getting kicked around, policies that will look after our selfish interests as 
against other countries. All of them maintain – are looking after their 
selfish interests as against us.27 
 
This statement demonstrated the US government’s administration’s top-down 
disposition that convinced Nixon to vindicate Pinochet. Such a mentality of political 
prerogative served to legitimize Pinochet’s authority, and more controversially, his 
                                               
26 This investigation will refer to this combination as “leftist” influences for the purposes of this thesis. 
The political activists that Pinochet persecuted came from a wide range of left-leaning views, some pro-
Cuba and anti-Soviet, others vice versa, and many political stances between. Furthermore, Pinochet 
targeted people more selectively than arbitrarily, but his fear tactics were particularly effective because he 
included among his victims anybody who hinted the possibility of being a sympathizer. 
27 OVAL; October 26, 1971 ; White House Tapes; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, 
Yorba Linda, California. 
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methods.28 This initial boost of legitimacy in the context of the Cold War was critical to 
protecting Pinochet’s regime from external interferences during its early stages. 
 When US newspapers picked up the drama of the Chilean coup, they framed 
Pinochet as a de facto illegitimate ruler, who had much to prove if he was going to 
justify his intervention. New York Times headlines during his first two years read: 
‘Supersecret’ Work of the CIA is scored, A Coup Aborted but a Democracy Dead, 1973 
Politico Hardly Word for Chile Junta Chief, US Expected Chile Coup but Decided not 
to Act, and The Costs of Peace Run High. The Los Angeles Times published articles 
with headlines that read: 10,000 Alien ‘Extremists’ in Chile Necessitated Coup - Junta 
Says, The Real Tragedy of the Downfall of Allende, ‘No Deals with Traitors’ - Chilean 
Leader Purportedly Replied to Coup Chief’s Offer, Chile Fears Disorder More than 
Dictator Pinochet, and Chile: Moral and Political Blindness. After the regime’s first 
years, the US government could not prove to offer enough legitimacy to cover for 
Pinochet’s practices. Eventually, public disapproval in the US citizenry joined with 
worldwide indignation and became a force that required the Chilean junta to seriously 
consider the implications of its methods. 
 
Goals 
General Pinochet’s immediate call of duty was to return a sense of calm to the 
streets of Santiago and other cities. As future president Patricio Aylwin described in an 
interview in 1973, Allende provoked a widespread feeling of desperation in the Chilean 
populace. Patricio Guzmán’s documentary The Battle of Chile displayed riots and 
                                               
28 Some political scientists refer to this vindicatory language as “whitewashing.” This describes the 
tendency of some leaders to help others conceal their faults, downplay the unacceptability of their 
methods, or cover for each other’s mistakes. 
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chaotic protests during the end of Allende’s administration.29 Police would clash with 
large groups of laborers on strike, and the discord heightened to alarming proportions. 
Pinochet recognized that there was much to gain and little to lose by making society 
feel at peace again. Reviving the economy would help to naturally straighten out the 
upheavals, at the least in that people would not have to quarrel for bread and wait in 
long lines for essential food items. 
Finally, Pinochet’s dramatic entrance naturally placed him in the international 
limelight, and the regime needed to secure new alliances. However self-motivated 
Nixon’s support was, Pinochet still felt the pressure of establishing a position on the 
world political stage. Pinochet recognized that he could attract foreign investment by 
restoring relationships with the foreign multinational corporations that Allende had 
expelled. To foreign reporters, Pinochet described authoritarian democracy as the 
necessary solution to the problem of communism.30 To Pinochet, an authoritarian 
democracy was neither a defective democracy nor a defective authoritarian regime. 
Pinochet portrayed Chile’s case as unique, this new type of regime that he called an 
“authoritarian democracy.” Pinochet described his conviction of the ideal design of a 
State, explaining: 
Let me tell you the three fundamental elements of the State. The 
individual, the collectivity...and the government - these must interact in a 
harmonious balance. When the collectivity is transformed so that it is 
above the government and the individual, that is the design of a 
dictatorship of the proletariat. We are looking for a balance, [in which] 
man has freedom, the freedom to think, freedom to act, economic 
freedom. For that, it is necessary for a government to give this freedom, 
to represent it, and that government must be authoritarian, solid, which 
prevents Marxist penetration...which is not dictatorship, but a 
                                               
29 The Battle of Chile. Directed by Patricio Guzmán. First Run/Icarus Films, 1976. DVD. 
30 Pinochet, Augusto. "Pinochet sobre la Democracia Cristiana y la UP." Youtube. November 3, 2010. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9tbI1NIBlY. 
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democracy...with an organism to care for him, to maintain that freedom, 
that will not let that freedom degenerate.31 
 
Pinochet was prepared to temporarily suspend the civic and political rights of Chileans 
for the sake of stronger liberties, and to suspend the right to self-determination for 
opportunities for self-development, or economic rights. Pinochet identified positive 
freedoms as those that functioned in reciprocal relations, elevating the government to 
elevate the collectivity and the individual too. The key was that individuals manage 
their lives within the State, and the government could access one of the few freedoms it 
needed to have, which was to manage the Marxist problem. 
 
 
Strategies 
 As early as the 1950s, the US formulated a Program for Economic Development 
called el ladrillo (“the brick”). Pinochet welcomed the project and its many advisors, 
who came to be known as the Chicago Boys, to guide his economic policies. Milton 
Friedman is credited with the authorship of the economic project, and told the NY 
Times, “‘The likelihood that the junta will be or can be temporary and that it will be 
possible to restore democracy hinges critically on the success of the regime in 
improving the economic situation.”32 Pinochet implemented free market reforms that 
stabilized the inflation that had gotten wildly out of control, expanded trade relations, 
                                               
31 Pinochet, Augusto. "Pinochet sobre la Democracia Cristiana y la UP." Youtube. November 3, 2010. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9tbI1NIBlY. 
32 Crittenden, Ann. " Loans From Abroad Flow to Chile’s Rightist Junta." New York Times, February 20, 
1976. Accessed May 15, 2015. 
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and privatized the state enterprises that had caused so much conflict between business 
owners and the UP.33 
International lending bodies also became involved, and the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank resumed 
the loans that they had discontinued when Allende had been in office. Pinochet’s 
liberalization, privatization, and deregulation measures produced positive results as well 
as popularity with the middle class. While Nixon actively attacked Allende’s economy, 
Pinochet’s economy experienced a flush of renewed US investment, and the military in 
particular was not wanting in support. Historian Jeremi Suri writes, “Instead of 
deploying half a million soldiers to Southeast Asia, Washington now sent bags of cash 
and caches of weapons to Augusto Pinochet and his third-world counterparts. Pinochet 
used these American-provided resources to conduct a domestic reign of terror.”34 
Pinochet rationalized that a free economy would create a free society in which Chileans 
found security in economic stability, satisfaction in access to goods, and hope in the 
potential to be entrepreneurs, not just a proletariat.35 
The actual economic crisis made Pinochet’s rescue mission narrative more 
compelling, but Pinochet did not want to depend on economic intervention alone to win 
hearts and minds. Another strategy that was key to Pinochet’s effort to gain legitimacy 
was the co-optation of the judiciary. This was facilitated by the polarization from the 
                                               
33 Allende confiscated and expropriated the properties of many companies in Chile. His failure to offer 
proportional confiscation caused rancor and frustration. 
34 Suri, Jeremi. Henry Kissinger and the American Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap of Harvard UP, 
2007, 272. 
35 Pinochet used such market-oriented rhetoric to reinforce his economic vision for Chilean society. 
Fernando Ardilla writes, “His central idea was to promote the development of a less protected market, 
according to his words ‘to make of Chile not a nation of proletariats, but a nation of entrepreneurs.’” 
Ardila, Fernando. Santos, Héroes Y Sátiros: "entre Más Cerca De La Fe, Más Lejos De Sus 
Mandamientos" Bogotá, Colombia: Fundación Propuesta De Paz, Centro De Estudios Políticos E 
Investigaciones Históricas, 2007. 
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Allende period, which had greatly embittered the Supreme Court. Economics scholar 
Edward Snyder explains, “The great ideological divide which was splintering the nation 
also affected the Chilean judiciary...Chilean judges were offended by Allende who, they 
claimed, openly flouted legal procedures and abused executive authority in his drive to 
build socialism...The Supreme Court became the target of severe and disparaging 
criticism from UP officials.”36 Allende’s party perceived the judiciary to be 
conservative, which obstructed the capabilities of Popular Unity politicians to 
implement their left-oriented policies. Correspondingly, Allende’s party resorted to 
extralegal measures that left the judiciary feeling invalidated. 
The judiciary had deemed illegitimate the socialist ideology that Allende used to 
legitimize his radical reforms, which they considered to defy national political tradition. 
When Pinochet took power, he invited judges to individually decide whether they 
would stay or go. The day after the coup, the judges put the weight of their authority 
behind Decree No. 5, which Pinochet issued to relay that the state of siege was 
essentially a state of internal war. Pinochet proceeded to identify dissidents whom the 
courts punished as traitors and political criminals.37 
American human rights lawyer Reed Brody affirms the claim that Pinochet 
found he did not have to coerce judges much at all. Brody writes, “[Pinochet’s] regime 
got an immediate endorsement from the Supreme Court…[which] in an official 
statement on September 13, 1973, expressed its ‘most intimate pleasure’...with the 
                                               
36 Snyder, Edward. "The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973-1995," 
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law (1995). 
37 Hilbink. Judges beyond Politics, 108. 
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military regime’s attitude toward the judiciary.”38 Many of the judges recognized in 
Pinochet a staunch commitment to “law and order,” which would reinstate judicial 
authority. Furthermore, his recognition of the power of their alliance would vindicate 
them from the Popular Unity’s identification of them as impediments to political 
projects. Political scientist Lisa Hilbink writes, “…after the 1973 military coup even 
judges personally at odds with the laws and practices of the military regime were 
professionally unwilling or unable to defend liberal democratic principles and practices. 
Publicly challenging the validity of the regime’s laws and policies in the name of 
liberal-democratic values and principles was viewed as unprofessional ‘political’ 
behavior, which threatened the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law.”39 With 
such an ally, Pinochet found he could use longstanding institutional frameworks and 
legal authorities to reinforce the urgency of the crisis and the country’s need for an 
intervention. 
For the majority of the populace, repression was not so directly violent, but 
rather extensively stifling of the rights and freedoms they had previously enjoyed. 
Pinochet banned labor unions, suspended political parties, highly restricted freedom of 
the press, and reinforced the seriousness of the “war” by detaining Chileans by the 
thousands. Meanwhile, torture and disappearances were vital to Pinochet’s ability to 
create an atmosphere of terror. This widespread terror, in turn, allowed Pinochet to 
transfer the terror that his security forces imposed to convince the populace that it was 
the leftist insurgents who were to fear. The agenda of combatting leftist radicals was 
                                               
38 Brody, Reed. The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain. (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000), 212. 
39 Hilbink, Lisa. Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile. (New York: 
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fundamental to Pinochet’s ability to establish legitimacy during the first two years of 
rule, when repression was highest. 
In her book Fear in Chile, Chilean journalist Patricia Politzer writes about a man 
named Manuel Bustos Huerto, who asserted in his testimony that he had been wrongly 
taken hostage by the Armed Forces. He was a Christian Democrat who had in fact been 
opposed to the UP. He expressed, “The two times that they called me to interrogate me, 
I asked them why they had me there, and both times the answer was the same: ‘For 
being an asshole.’ ...We had no explanation for the violence that we saw.”40 An 
“asshole” could defame Pinochet, but the question was whether an “asshole” could 
destabilize Pinochet. Whether or not the National Intelligence Directorate’s (DINA) 
victims were rightly or wrongly identified, the reality was that Pinochet needed to 
extinguish domestic opposition forces, because too many Chileans still regarded 
Allende’s death as a loss and Pinochet’s not as gain or opportunity. Bustos Huerto 
describes his experience on his way out of the National Stadium: “At the gate, they 
stopped us and made us sign a document stating that we had been well treated...the 
official shook hands with each of us, saying: ‘If any of you have had any problems, 
you’ll have to pardon us because this is all to save Chile. In the confusion, some things 
may have happened for which we, as soldiers, ask you, as Chileans, to pardon us.’”41 
Though such apologies were rare and probably scripted to not make more enemies, the 
important point was Pinochet’s tendency to represent himself as a savior.  
Regarding the capabilities of his regime to solve Chile’s most urgent problems, 
Pinochet claimed he had “normalized” society when he had stamped out protest from 
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the streets and revived the damaged economy. Nevertheless, he maintained the state of 
siege to warn Chileans that leftist subversives were necessarily antagonistic to his 
regime. Because of them, he argued, he could not normalize political life in Chile, yet. 
Unity building was a difficult task for many Chileans who anxiously learned of the 
tragic fates of their neighbors, colleagues, and friends. The General knew he forced 
danger upon Chileans who braved the secret police to defend each other, much less 
blame the government, for fear of association. It was far safer to pretend not to notice or 
depoliticize their behavior and remain silent. “If there exists blame,” Pinochet spoke in 
reference to the late president, “it lies upon those whose attitudes conflict with the 
Constitution and our laws, disregard their duties as head of state, attempt to produce 
internal chaos.”42 Constitutionalism was a uniting conviction, but if Chileans chose out 
of this identity, the junta could point to them as people who wanted to delegitimize the 
Constitution. 
Where moral persuasion failed to convince citizens that the military junta was 
formed for Chile’s best interest, Pinochet turned to propagandistic strategies for extra 
impact. The year of the coup, the Secretary General of Chile authorized historian 
Gonzalo Vial Correa and Admiral Patricio Carjaval to fabricate a fictitious “Plan Z” 
within the book The White Book of the Change of Government in Chile. The book was 
chock full of disinformation that aimed to expose unlawful undertakings of Allende to 
execute an autogolpe.43 The purpose of the book was to discredit the Allende 
government and justify the coup d’état as a rescue mission for an imploding society and 
a preemptive defense against an ostensible self-coup. The White Book framed Allende 
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as a two-timing politician who valued his ideological agenda above national ideals, and 
who would sacrifice many Chilean lives for the sake of a communist triumph.44 The 
authors implied such treacherous ambitions to be inherently anti-Chilean. Pinochet 
knew that such defamation would make the left coalition extremely vulnerable to the 
growing indignation of its right-wing counterpart. In an interview conducted just a 
couple days after the coup, Pinochet said to a French journalist, “You know that in the 
Moneda [presidential palace] there were machine guns and Russian tanks...Either they 
had to surrender, or if not, we had to act, because they were going to attack us.”45 
However, according to Patricio Guzmán’s famed documentary La batalla de Chile: El 
golpe de Estado, no such stockpile of weapons existed that anyone could trace to 
Allende.46 
 
  
                                               
44 A Senate Committee reported on the White Book in 1975, “A ‘scare campaign,’ using many of the 
same themes as the 1964 presidential election program, equated an Allende victory with violence and 
Stalinist repression...two CIA collaborators assisted the Junta in preparing a White Book of the Change of 
Government in Chile. The White Book published by the Junta shortly after the coup, was written to justify 
the overthrow of Allende. It was distributed widely both in Washington and in other foreign capitals.” 
US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities: “Church Committee,” 1975-76, 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/churchcommittee.html. 
 
45 Pinochet, Augusto. “1974 – Augusto Pinochet concede entrevista – Chile.” Youtube. September 22, 
2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3PmP--OGPOM. 
46 General Carlos Prats wrote in his diary, “The supposed ‘Plan Z’ is just ridiculous, because it is 
militarily impossible, besides the absolute absurdity that the political leaders of the Popular Unity would 
have designed this type of  a plan. Therefore, ‘Plan Z’ can be nothing but a resource, an invention, 
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constitutionality ,and oriented in practice principally to assure the unity of the Armed Forces in the 
execution of orders from the Higher Mandate leading the coup. This ‘Plan Z’ invention is even more 
absurd for those of us who know from up-close the efforts of President Allende...to obtain successful 
dialogues with the Christian Democrats and to seek a solution to the crisis through a plebiscite.” 
Lez, Carlos. Diario Del General De Ejército Carlos Prats, Ex Comandante En Jefe Del Ejército Chileno. 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Fundamentos, (1984), 44. 
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Results 
 
Domestic 
 “Complete success,” General Pinochet said in an interview when an American 
journalist asked him to evaluate the success of the junta in 1974. Hardly one year after 
the coup, General Pinochet felt satisfied that his government had capably normalized 
society and resolved the inflation that Allende had caused. Chileans yearned for 
certainty, stability, and security in their futures. Foreign investors had responded 
favorably to Pinochet’s invitation to participate in Chile’s market, and the general 
managed the economy with efficiency that had been sorely absent under Allende. 
As the economy began to prosper, Pinochet appeared to gain more favor with 
the sectors of society that had experienced the greatest losses under Allende’s 
administration. The Canadian Embassy in Chile recognized the apparently high rates of 
approval that a 1975 gallup poll revealed. The report stated, “The President comes out 
well on the survey in receiving the following marks: tries to help everyone: 76%; is 
practical: 68%; is sincere: 74%; is serious and prudent: 64%. Significantly and not 
surprisingly, by an overwhelming majority of 87%, the people interviewed pointed to 
the economic situation as the most serious concerns faced by Chileans. Problems of jobs 
and housing far dominated people’s desires for solution of a top priority by 
Government.”47 Only two years after the coup, General Pinochet already appeared to 
have won more or less three-quarters of the population’s hearts and minds.48 The 
general gave Chileans the certainty of less political and civil rights, in exchange for the 
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stability of wider economic rights and opportunities, built into a sense of guaranteed 
security. 
Not far from the Marxist subversives, in Pinochet’s line of vision, were the 
Christian Democrats, who Pinochet distrusted for having willingly conspired with 
“dictatorial” Allende.49 In an interview with a Spanish journalist, Pinochet said: 
The Christian Democrats believed that the revolution of September 11th 
had unfolded for them. They wanted us to stop the processes we started, 
clean the house, and then hand it all over to the Christian Democrats, 
forgetting that they hold blame for allowing Marxism-Leninism to come 
to power. They could have detained them in the senate...they wanted to 
tell the Armed Forces, ‘conform,’ because they had an agreement with 
Mr. Allende, and they brought him to power. They signed a series of 
documents that referred to the Constitution, which Mr. Allende did not 
respect at any moment of his presidency. They knew that.50 
 
Pinochet attempted to extend the longevity of his government by transforming the 
original panic framework into a prevention framework, communicating to the people 
that they needed the Armed Forces to be on its guard on their behalf. 
 The peak of repression was the immediate aftermath of the coup, but the Armed 
Forces were quick to reestablish order on the city streets and wipe out Pinochet’s 
opposition. The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report categorized 
into different types of gross human rights violations (GHRV): extrajudicial executions, 
undue use of force, abuse of power, torture, disappearance, political violence, and non-
classified violations.51 The report records the annual GHRV numbers to be 1,264 cases 
                                               
49 Pinochet, Augusto. “Entrevista al Gral. Augusto Pinochet en 1973.” Youtube. December 29, 2006. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzVKE_uo5fQ. 
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in 1973 and 338 in 1974. These repressive measures dropped even lower to 132 cases in 
1975 as less dissidents remained, and those remaining were less able to muster the 
capabilities to fight the Armed Forces. German Scholar Wolfgang S. Heinz and Chilean 
researcher Hugo Fruhling write, “Changes in the political affiliation of those who 
disappeared show that this method responded to a pre-conceived [sic] policy: during 
1974 and the first months of 1975, a great percentage of the victims were members of 
the MIR. Until the first half of 1975, this method was applied to members of the 
Socialist Party. Afterwards, the main target group becomes the Communist Party.”52 
Indeed, 17.8% of GHRV victims belonged to the MIR, 17.6% belonged to the Socialist 
Party, and 16.1% belonged to the Communist Party. 
As Pinochet killed off and demoralized Chile’s most important organized 
opposition groups, the chaos of the country quieted down and the people learned what 
not to do if they wanted to stay safe. With a semblance of peace present, Pinochet’s 
claim to apolitical rule was losing momentum as a compelling narrative. Now his 
problem was not how to maneuver repression within Chile, but what to do when his 
next immediate task was to convince the rest of the citizenry that his power was 
beneficial, even imperative, to the country. Several foreign journalists who interviewed 
Pinochet inquired as to when, or if, he would hand over power to civilian politicians. He 
responded impatiently to one such Spanish journalist’s query saying, “The military 
government never had the intention to turn power over to the Christian Democrats, 
because that would be...going backwards. [You would be asking us to] trust a 
dictatorship of the proletariat, the one towards which Allende was on the way. Hence, a 
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no, a clear no, to the Christian Democrats...they have not even had the patriotic bravery 
to manage the situation...political parties...have often tried to distort [my intentions].”53 
At the time of the coup, many Chileans justified Pinochet for pacifying their 
undisciplined political counterparts. However, when Pinochet’s government had 
effectively restored law and order, more and more Chileans deemed his repression to be 
“excessive.” Chileans increasingly wanted to move on from having an apolitical 
military leader to a civilian politician, but Pinochet did not envision himself to be just 
“the interim president.” Pinochet’s problem grew to be that as he achieved his 
government’s purpose of normalization, it became harder to convince Chileans that they 
still needed him. 
 
United States 
President Nixon and National Security Advisor Kissinger demonstrated little 
alarm when news of the brutality of Chilean repression reached the White House during 
Pinochet’s first years. Kissinger had been negotiating with Pinochet with the certainty 
that Pinochet would not act to the degradation of the US image. Though repression was 
not politically conducive to the cause of democracy, repression was a common reality in 
the Cold War, and both administrations proceeded knowing that the anti-communist 
world still, thus far, supported ideological competition more intensely than it did 
democracy and human rights. The British Embassy at Santiago document demonstrated 
this political confidence: 
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The fact is that, however critical Congress and American public opinion 
may be about the Chilean military regime, the United States Embassy 
here seem to be keeping their heads down and quietly strengthening their 
position. On general political and strategic grounds, I imagine that the 
State Department take [sic] the view that there is a heavy balance of 
advantage to them in the survival of the Chilean regime; while United 
States economic and business interests, which suffered so heavily under 
the Allende Administration, clearly have much to gain from the new 
order. For the Americans, the snag in all this is Chile’s bad international 
image...while the Americans are keeping out of the limelight, they are 
working quite effectively in the background to further their interests and 
influence in Chile.54 
 
As the disconnect that had kept the US public uninformed grew to become an awareness 
filled with outcry, Chile’s bad image resulted to be more than a snag for the Nixon 
administration. 
In 1975, Senator Frank Church of Idaho established a committee to “study 
governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.”55 NY Times journalist 
Seymour Hersh had been delving deep into the intelligence agency’s covert activities 
and publishing information since the previous year, and Congress was outraged that its 
authority had been omitted from the Chile decision-making processes. As a result, 
President Gerald Ford issued an executive order that banned executives from supporting 
assassinations of foreign leaders.56 Tensions erupted within the US government between 
those who claimed the CIA’s activities had been legitimate, while others denounced 
them as outside of the rules of sovereignty and acceptable political conduct. Different 
sectors of the government felt their power threatened, and it became more risky and 
discreditable for world leaders to openly back Pinochet. As the US drew back aid, 
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Pinochet came to see the flip side of the double-edged sword that was US support. The 
power of the US executive that first helped Pinochet repress Chileans was now causing 
him to pull back from acting as if he held proportionate executive power. 
 
International 
As early as September 28 the year of the coup, the CIA Directorate of 
Operations reported that “the military Junta was deeply concerned over the unfavorable 
image it feels it has developed, that especially internationally, but also domestically, the 
military government has the image of being ‘bloody and repressive.’ [Omitted] The 
Junta recognized it had made mistakes in its initial conduct and was willing to take 
measures to correct them and to improve its image.”57 However, Pinochet’s concern in 
this case arose because because low-ranking and working class Chileans expressed 
alarm at the mutilated cadavers of former UP members that had appeared in Santiago’s 
Mapocho River. The fear that this discovery effected grew into fruit ripe for picking by 
discontent revolutionaries in the rest of Latin America who sought to rekindle Chile’s 
dissident minority that the NY Times described as “cowed, silent and pessimistic.”58 
Dramatic stories such as these reached American ears up north, which was in 
these first two years reading NY Times stories named “I.T.T. & C.I.A. A Little Plot for 
Chile?”, “A Low-Level Memoir of the Nixon White House,” “C.I.A. Said to Have 
Asked Funds for Chile Rightists in ‘73” and “CIA Role in Chile Cited by Kissinger.”59 
Shortly after Ford replaced Nixon as president, the Church Committee investigations 
                                               
57 Central Intelligence Agency Report, “Chilean Junta’s International Image,” September 28, 1973. 
58 De Onis, Juan. " Chile Four Months Later: Leftists Falling Into Line " New York Times, January 28, 
1974. Accessed May 15, 2015. 
59 New York Times Archives. 
  
 
32 
publicized these activities and irreparably associated American intelligence with 
Chilean intelligence’s extreme violence. Right-wing Chilean newspaper El Mercurio 
published a gallup poll on August 8, 1975, to which both the US and Chile took care to 
pay attention. NSA document 01278 recorded the following regarding foreign 
perceptions of Chile: 
The Gallup Poll prefaces its statistics by stating that an average of 41% 
of the foreigners canvassed in 16 countries was unaware whether Chile 
was governed by an elected President or a Military Junta. Once this 
degree of widespread ignorance was established to the detriment and 
injury of Chilean national pride, the survey goes on to note… 
-54% of foreigners interviewed thought of Chile as ‘dictatorial’ 
-11% as ‘democratic’; 
 -42% as ‘unstable’; 17% as ‘peaceful’; 
 -45% as ‘cruel’; 13% as ‘benevolent’; 
 -43% as ‘unjust’; 14% as ‘just’; 
 -38% as ‘backwards’; 22% as ‘progressive’ 
-In a list of South American countries ranked progressively in 
terms of ‘least freedom’, the survey reports Chile was found 
evalued [sic] consistently at the top of the list.60 
 
What is noteworthy about the Ford Administration’s perception of this poll is that it 
distorted the facts to ends that were once more self-victimizing. The creators of this US 
document accuse foreigners of fooling themselves out of ignorance and into 
misinterpretation of the facts. The document called Pinochet “elected,” a false portrayal, 
and secondly accused the world of injuring Chile’s national dignity through demeaning 
judgments. Pinochet responded defensively, as represented in an editorial that the 
dominant pro-junta newspaper El Mercurio wrote. The Canadian Embassy described it 
as having “philosophically accepted Chile’s unpopularity abroad as a rude indication of 
the degree of success which communist publicity has had in perverting international 
opinion against Chile. The editorial noted that little else could be expected with the 
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weighting of the propaganda scales against the scanty international resources of a 
country whose dual inheritance from the Marxists was economic bankruptcy and social 
chaos.”61 
Pinochet acknowledged that the junta had accomplished its immediate goals, but 
he responded to people inside and outside of Chile who questioned his timeframe with 
the warning that Marxists remained who were simply waiting in hiding, armed and 
committed to violence. They planned to subvert the social order, but Pinochet promised 
he would preside as long as it took to fight them off. An American journalist asked 
Pinochet in 1974, “Can you predict when the power will be returned to the people of 
Chile?” Pinochet responded, “That is a question that everybody asks, señorita...but we 
cannot restrict ourselves to terms or time limits. Only objectives.” However ambiguous 
Pinochet’s justification, he was aware that in 1974, 72.6% of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations condemned the human rights situation in Chile, and in 1975, 73.6% 
of voting nations denounced his government’s repression. Heinz and Fruhling write, 
“The military government constantly discounted the UN resolutions, claiming that these 
were destabilizing tactics. Nonetheless, the impact of these resolutions was not 
irrelevant, since, in 1977, the military regime called a Consulta General (a sort of 
National Referendum), with the clear objective of trying to gain electoral legitimacy in 
the face of the UN’s reiterated condemnation.”62 
Bilaterally, the rising international disapproval of the military regime produced 
tangible punishment for Pinochet. Heinz and Fruhling explain that in 1974, Britain’s 
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labor government imposed a weapons embargo on Chile, Germany suspended 
development aid, and more South American countries granted political asylum to 
refugees. Favor with the White House had brought Pinochet renegotiation of Chile’s 
foreign debt and substantial economic aid, but this advantage would already start to 
dwindle as the US legislature started to check the authority of its executive counterpart. 
Walker asserts that Pinochet was only susceptible to outside pressure to the point that a 
positive response to human rights on his part would help rather than hurt the stability of 
his government.63 It was not until 1975 that he felt his military regime to be vulnerable, 
when US military assistance dropped significantly. The US had given the military a 
boost when it took hold of power in 1973 with $15.01 million (USD), which rose to 
$16.14 million the next year. However, in 1975, as international scrutiny escalated, the 
US government cut military assistance to $0.62 million. Nevertheless, to motivate the 
world to believe that Pinochet was actually working for economic and social growth, 
rather than military growth, the US government increased aid from $0.8 million in 1973 
to $5.3 million in 1974, and even $31.3 million in 1975.64 
In order to diplomatically defend Pinochet’s cause, Kissinger took advantage of 
the up and coming conference of the Organization of American States and promoted 
Santiago to be the meeting spot.65 All leaders were aware that human rights violations 
in Chile would be a hot topic on the discussion agenda. Kissinger was also well aware 
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that Pinochet was first and foremost a military general, not a politician, so he reminded 
the general that repression produced collateral damage, as the world became 
increasingly aware of who was tending to the authoritarian leader. On June 8, 1976 
Kissinger told Pinochet, shortly before the meeting was to commence, “In the United 
States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here. I think that 
the previous government was headed toward communism. We wish your government 
well...We are behind you. You are the leader. But...you have a punitive system for your 
friends.”66 The security of the alliance that Pinochet and Nixon had built upon emphatic 
anti-communism was ideologically intact, but progressively bending to the mercy of a 
world sensitive to human rights. 
Despite the risk of appearing to the world to compromise on human rights for 
political purposes, Kissinger pushed General Pinochet to reconcile with human rights so 
that the world could validate their friendship. Since the declassification of NSA 
documents, Kissinger became famous for telling Pinochet: 
We want an outcome which is not deeply embarrassing to you. But as 
friends, I must tell you that we face a situation in the United States where 
we must be able to point to events here in Chile, or we will be 
defeated...We welcomed the overthrow of the communist-inclined 
government here. We are not out to weaken your position...We want to 
remove the weapons in the arms of our enemies...We want to help, not 
undermine you. You did a great service to the West in overthrowing 
Allende.67 
 
Kissinger addressed Pinochet with an attitude of reluctant obligation, but both tacitly 
acknowledged that they had reached their limit in acting too deceptively for the US and 
international publics. Privately, their discussion of human rights was little nuanced; 
instead, their exchange was political and bureaucratic, though they addressed each other 
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with the confidence of friends. Kissinger provided Pinochet advance warning of the 
implications of the OAS conference, saying: 
I am going to speak about human rights this afternoon in the General 
Assembly. I delayed my statement until I could talk to you. I wanted you 
to understand my position. We want to deal in moral persuasion, not by 
legal sanctions...I will also call attention to the Cuba report and to the 
hypocrisy of some who call attention to human rights as a means of 
intervening in governments. I can do no less, without producing a 
reaction in the US which would lead to legislative restrictions...My 
evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the 
world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government 
which was going communist. But we have a practical problem we have 
to take into account, without bringing about pressures incompatible with 
your dignity, and at the same time which does not lead to US laws which 
will undermine our relationship.68 
 
As noted in the conversation, Kissinger affirmed Pinochet’s narrative of victimization, 
and he deemed the value of the human rights obligation as a subject that could be 
resolved through “moral persuasion.” Kissinger implied that Pinochet was lucky to 
share diplomatic relations of moral persuasion, since the logic was that legal sanctions 
should be reserved for political resistant countries such as Cuba. However, Pinochet 
was less and less willing to accept the US government’s patronizing attitude, which 
demeaned his power and subjected his regime’s legitimacy to US needs, conveniences, 
and now obligations. As a result, Pinochet transposed his victim narrative to accuse the 
Ford administration for failing to adequately support its ideological partner. By 
reciprocating pressure back onto the US, Pinochet affirmed the international conviction 
that human rights was a force to be reckoned with, enough to be oppressive to an 
authoritarian government. 
Regardless of the intergovernmental tensions, Kissinger’s motives convinced 
OAS participants and human rights proponents. Though he had confided in Pinochet 
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that his speech was harsh on Chile for political purposes, the international community 
bought Kissinger’s message that the US government was staunchly pro-human rights. 
After the conference, NY Times headlines read: “Kissinger Assails Chile Over Curbs” 
and “UN United Says Chile Abuses Widen.” The US government benefitted publicly by 
openly criticizing the Chilean government, and privately by assuring General Pinochet 
that its discourses were not what the two administrations were really agreeing upon. 
This was not the only advantage to the Chilean junta. Shortly after the OAS meeting, 
sixteen American and Canadian banks loaned the Chilean government $125 million.69 
At this time, the US still represented the epitome of power in the West, but Pinochet 
began testing out his own clout by complaining that investment in Chile had been 
inconsistent. The Ford administration realized by now that it could incur losses if it 
disappointed General Pinochet; however, the Chilean image would still have to conform 
to the evolving standards emphasizing democracy and human rights. According to 
Tanya Harmer, Kissinger acted sycophantically. She writes, “After expressing his 
heartfelt support to Pinochet, Kissinger had to listen to his host chastise the United 
States for not offering his regime more help and for abandoning its Cold War 
responsibilities...Two years earlier, for example, Chilean military leaders had already 
complained about having to ‘fight alone against half the world.’”70 The US executive 
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were quickly discovering that they were the ones pressured by two sides. They were 
concerned that the world would associate its government with one that was cruel, 
unjust, and backwards. Consequently, Kissinger endeavored to change the projected 
representation of Chile, instead of opting for dissociation. The US government had 
desired for its Cold War rivals to view it as “hard on communism,” but the inversion to 
“hard on human rights” was beyond Kissinger’s control.  
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Era of Institutionalization (1975-1980) 
Following the Church Committee investigations, the White House’s ability to 
back the junta became dramatically restricted. Pinochet realized that US executive 
authority would not be capable of supporting his regime in opposition to the US 
legislature, the UN, and the OAS. With each passing year of the second era, he watched 
the numbers collide contrarily to his expectations and to the detriment of his legitimacy. 
By 1976, human rights backlash was seriously threatening to delegitimize Pinochet’s 
standing on the global stage. The Ford administration was also feeling increasingly 
uneasy about publicity covering the undemocratic actions of the executive and CIA. 
Now NY Times headlines said: “Factionalism, Fraud, Opportunism are the Pallbearers,” 
“Chile was the Watergate of the United States Foreign Policy,” and “Repression, Guile 
Keep Pinochet On Top in Chile.”71 The US legislature demanded that military 
assistance to Chile be completely cut off, and the unresolved human rights dilemma 
pressured the government to also cut development aid from $20.6 million in 1976 to 
$0.57 million in 1977, and $0.16 million in 1978.72 The Nixon had gotten the aid to 
Pinochet during the most critical years of mass detentions, extrajudicial executions, and 
other political violence. However, Pinochet’s reputation of brutality was now so 
pronounced and international support so drained that the Ford administration had to 
suspend aid to avoid conflicting with its own public agenda of promoting democracy, 
freedom, and human rights. 
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Goals 
This study explores the period 1975-80 to show how Pinochet changed his 
strategies for legitimization in this period from outright coercion to centralization of 
power. In response to external pressures, Pinochet relinquished most of his force in 
exchange for the law as an alternative instrument for formulating new rules, creating 
sanctions within a framework of legality, and concentrate his authority in the national 
institutions he reopened. Through new laws he justified consistently that democracy 
was coming; it was just never quite ready yet. The General tried to reframe his 
legitimacy to the US and his critics repeatedly over the years following the Church 
investigations. However, his attempts were ineffective to the human rights world, since 
he had already made the impact of founding his whole regime on so much violence, 
including disappeared bodies that would stay disappeared as evidence of his illicit 
measures. 
Though Pinochet tried to work backwards and recreate his argument for 
legitimacy, the farther through the decade he passed, the harder it was for him to 
legitimize his governance on the same conditions of the coup. The Cold War 
equilibrium was shifting favor so much away from “justified violence” that the world 
more forthrightly challenged Pinochet to measure up to democracy, instead of lie to get 
there. He had to assuage the discrepancy between his rhetoric of democracy and his 
systematic suppression of political and civil rights. General Pinochet knew he had to 
respond to a country and a world still awaiting a democracy that he, a non-elected 
authoritarian leader, was delaying. One French journalist asked him whether the 
concept of “dictatorship” was relevant to his regime, and he appeared to cringe. He said 
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in a disturbed tone, “I don’t like that word.”73 To realize a stronger and more 
convincing facade of democracy while ensuring his political survival, Pinochet adapted 
to institute new mechanisms, tools, and diplomatic tactics for the rest of the 1970s. 
As human rights increasingly became a political norm for leaders to respect, 
Pinochet showed the world he could meet its standards. He calculated that the benefit of 
legitimacy through violent repression of resistance was no longer greater than the costs 
of repression, the negative reputation by which the international community defined 
him. After sequential defining moments disadvantaged his junta’s stability, Pinochet’s 
goal for the second half of the 1970s became to show his skeptics and critics that his 
regime was legitimate, even without having to repress dissidents. 
 
Strategies 
On September 21, 1976, US-Chile relations took a definitive turn. On this day, 
three DINA agents assassinated former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his 
assistant Ronnie Moffit through a car bombing on embassy row in Washington.74 This 
event impassioned critics of the military regime and gave momentum to their 
condemnations of the General’s human rights violations. Their impact on the military 
junta was even stronger now that their censure was accompanied by a White House that 
was furious that Pinochet had dared to breach US sovereignty. 
 It did not help Pinochet defend his reputation that on September 27, 1976 the 
NY Times posthumously published an article that the former ambassador had written 
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before his death. The article was titled A Testament and opened, “On Sep. 10 the 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet issued Decree No. 588, which strips me of my 
nationality, for gravely threatening the essential interests of the state. This measure is 
just one more addition to the shameful history of the violation of human rights 
committed by the military junta.”75 Interestingly, Letelier blames Pinochet for being 
“totalitarian,” which contrasts sharply with the US’s illustration of the general as more 
of a benign dictator. Letelier wrote, “behind [the act of stripping my citizenship] one 
sees the logic of a totalitarian mentality, that it projects itself from within a system 
based on terror and vengeance.” This was the first close-up experience with terror to 
many Americans who read the testament in the NY Times. Letelier was a well-
respected figure, and the US government had cared to pay attention to the ambassador’s 
outspoken disapproval of the military regime. 
Following the assassination, Pinochet braced himself, and everybody knew it. 
The CIA reported on Pinochet’s strategy: “Protect General (R) [sic] Manuel Contreras 
from successful prosecution in the murder of Letelier, since Pinochet’s political survival 
is dependent upon Contreras’ fate. Stonewall any further requests from the US 
government that would serve to build a case against Contreras and other 
Chileans...Continue to exploit Chilean nationalism with a covert action campaign to 
portray the Letelier investigation as being politically motivated -- another pretext for 
destabilizing the Pinochet regime.”76 The US wanted to protect Colonel Manuel 
Contreras and by extension, his jefe, but assassinations could not go unpunished. It was 
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too late for Pinochet to completely rescue his legitimacy by disassociation, for his close 
ties to the Colonel were common knowledge. The DINA was both highly capable and 
loyal, if not fearful of the commander-in-chief. It was highly unlikely that the DINA 
undertook the Letelier assassination mission without due authorization. 
Suddenly the center of unwanted attention, Pinochet looked outward. On April 6 
de Onis wrote, “In a nationally televised speech, President Pinochet said his ‘conscience 
is clean...We will do everything possible to get to the truth and see that those who are 
responsible are punished, whatever their position or nationality.’ ...He called for an 
‘iron clad unity’ in facing international problems…[and] that the charge that Chile’s 
military leaders had ordered the killing of Mr. Letelier was part of an ‘international 
conspiracy’ seeking to place Chile in conflict with the United States and its 
neighbors.”77 To remove his government from the possibility of delegitimization, 
Pinochet excluded himself from the alleged “international conspiracy” and tried, albeit 
belatedly, to realign his interests with those of the US.  
However, the “international conspiracy” of which Pinochet warned pressured 
him to own up to the blood that his government had spilled. One way Pinochet 
responded was to institutionalize his power, meaning to centralize it through laws, so 
that attempts at contestation would require his critics to address the mechanisms of 
political structures. A Department of State memorandum described a letter Pinochet 
wrote to Carter that justified that his positive response to human rights was “not because 
of external pressure which, contrary to what is assumed, and above all in the case of my 
country, is paradoxically counterproductive, but because of the imperative of deeply 
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rooted humanitarian and moral convictions.”78 The State Department recognized that 
Pinochet was bitter “over what he sees as our failure to understand Chile’s position and 
our interference in Chilean internal affairs.” Furthermore, according to the memo, the 
General still believed a majority of the Chilean people supported him. In reality, as an 
unnamed veteran politician active among underground party committees estimated to 
the NY Times in 1977, approximately 25 percent of Chileans were “wholeheartedly 
committed” to the General while another 25 percent preferred his junta “if an election 
would return things to the violence, scarcities, and insecurity of the Popular Unity 
Government.”79 
Shortly after the Letelier assassination, the inauguration of Jimmy Carter on 
January 27, 1977 brought Pinochet another surprise. Though President Carter disagreed 
strongly with Pinochet’s use of power, he failed to take advantage of the Letelier 
assassination to harshly reprimand the junta’s abuse of power or coerce it to change its 
ways. Following the Letelier assassination, Carter refused to extradite the Chileans who 
were indicted for involvement in the car bombing. Congressman Tom Harkin called 
Carter “despicably weak.”80 Carter was criticized for his soft stance, which arguably 
encouraged Pinochet to pursue his goals through more aggressive diplomacy with the 
US. 
Outside of diplomacy, Pinochet still realized he had to change his strategies, 
since his security forces had made Pinochet lose a great amount of authority. There 
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could be no time more inopportune for using repression than now. One of the ways 
Pinochet tried to persuade the world he was advancing toward democracy was to release 
some of his political prisoners. He strategically discharged detainees, which generated 
among Chileans an illusion that they were gaining back freedom and democratic rights. 
Meanwhile, letting detainees go allowed the General to preserve most of his power, 
since the atmosphere of fear in Chilean society generally functioned more effectively 
when tortured prisoners were let out – often paranoid, desperate for refuge, and usually 
broken.81 The more prisoners Pinochet released, the more he could claim to Chileans 
that he was facilitating the prosperous and stable democracy they wanted. A NY Times 
article called “Chile, Image-Building Still Harsh” was published on December 12, 1976 
and read, “The right-wing military junta in Chile is moving decisively to erase the most 
visible elements of its repressive image, but without dismantling the pervasive state-
security apparatus or reviving the country’s traditional democratic institutions.”82 
Journalist Jonathan Kendell explained that as soon as the Chilean government released 
300 political prisoners out of 1,200 detainees, Washington was already prepared to vote 
favorably on renewed World Bank loans to Chile. 
 Another way that Pinochet attempted to enhance the junta’s pretense of 
democracy and hint that Chile was ready for more freedom was by issuing a restricted 
amnesty on April 19, 1978, to allow Chilean exiles to return home. Through Decree 
2.191 he announced that the military tribunals would wipe clean the records that had 
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charged or convicted these Chileans.83 According to the NY Times, spokesmen from 
the Department of State welcomed this show of generosity as a positive contribution to 
Chile’s improvement of the human rights situation.84 The State expressed satisfaction 
that such alleviation of political punishments would “‘accelerate the return to 
Constitutional government.’” With this sentiment of approval, the Department of 
Agriculture subsequently approved $38 million worth of credits for farmers in Chile. 
The catch with this amnesty was that Pinochet disabled the legal mechanisms that 
forced him to disclose the records on disappeared Chileans. The criminal charges 
against his security forces were likewise dropped, and the courts closed the 
disappearance cases without further conclusions. 
By this time, warnings and pressure to respect human rights surrounded 
Pinochet mostly from the outside, as by now opposition inside Chile was effectively 
intimidated into silence. A human rights lawyer commented to the NY Times, “‘The 
DINA is no longer interested in mass arrests and disappearances that would be too 
controversial. They can get their message across to labor unions, concerned church 
officials and others by picking up a relatively few selected people whom they whole and 
mistreat for a few hours.’” 85 Secret police agents began visiting families of the 
disappeared and intimidating them to retract their charges. The NY Times commented 
that the agency’s reputation for cruelty was enough to cause the families terror even 
without explicit resort to violence. 
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Results 
 
Domestic 
After the Letelier assassination, even people who loyally carried out Pinochet’s 
orders were beginning to doubt the situation he had created. Pinochet’s reputation was 
closely connected to that of Colonel Contreras, who had functioned as his right-hand-
man throughout the duration of the regime. De Onis wrote in the NY Times: 
Opponents of the junta harbor the hope that new disclosures by 
American investigators will undermine confidence in General Pinochet. 
The unforeseen and unexplained resignation from the army this week of 
Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda was seen as a crack in the ruling 
group formed by General Pinochet… ‘Contreras used to have breakfast 
with President Pinochet every day when he was head of Dina, and now 
he was thrown out of the army by his sponsor,’ a recently retired general 
commented. ‘Every officer is asking why.’ ...a foreign banker 
emphasized that unity in military leadership was needed to maintain 
sound economic policy.86 
 
Pinochet was not about to let internal strife in the hierarchy menace his hard won 
legitimacy, so he promptly dismissed Contreras.87 His discharge brought the 
competence, the control, and the mandate of Chilean intelligence services into question. 
The DINA was a highly capable organism, and it had effectively inhibited dissent in the 
citizenry. Nevertheless, when the organization was found guilty for assassinating 
Ambassador Letelier, the DINA undermined the president’s legitimacy so that human 
rights proponents demanded the DINA be terminated entirely. Pinochet dissolved the 
DINA, but in turn created the CNI, essentially a replica of its precursor. The main 
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exception in its design was the emphasis on intelligence over security, and the apparent 
absence of power to arrests citizens, but it was meant to be reassuring to human rights 
advocates worldwide who refused to let the DINA continue functioning.88 
The repercussions of the Letelier assassination reverberated from afar to within, 
to the detriment of Pinochet’s international legitimacy for the next couple years. In 
1978, the US Embassy in Santiago reported to the State Department, “Who leads the 
Chilean political transition process no longer seems as crucial as it did just a few weeks 
ago. Then Pinochet appeared to be the main stumbling block to timely change, now, in 
an ironic twist, Pinochet’s vulnerabilities may have converted him into a person with a 
sizeable stake in a speeded up transition…No abrupt changes in our policy of cool 
disdain are as yet indicated.”89 Pinochet, for now, continued to merit the cool disdain of 
the US executive while laying new foundations. Pinochet foresaw that a new 
constitution was necessary to institutionalize his political efforts into a regime with an 
enduring structure. Pressured to open the regime to civilian rule, Pinochet urgently 
sought to create a new system for military rule. 
To meet the evolving conditions for political legitimacy in front of a human 
rights world that was increasingly unforgiving, Pinochet sought to change the political 
rules through a new legal framework. Snyder explains: 
In an attempt to assuage mounting international and domestic criticism, 
the junta, in 1976, issued a set of four ‘constitutional acts’ which sought 
to reaffirm basic concepts of law, democracy, rights, and duties. These 
acts were viewed by the government as the first step in the 
implementation of a new constitution which would provide legitimacy 
for the existing state of affairs and convince critics that the military 
regime, in fact, respected human rights. But what the government gave 
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with one hand it took away with the other...Act No. 4 laid out the 
framework through which these same rights could be restricted, 
suspended, or lost during states of exception.90 
 
Pinochet forged new mechanisms of democracy through these kinds of constitutional 
acts, but in reality, they produced little relief for most Chileans. The wide array of rights 
that Pinochet promised contrasted starkly with daily life that was still widely bereft of 
political and civil rights. What the constitutional acts effectively achieved was to help 
Pinochet shield his legitimacy and prevent it from fragmenting at a juncture of great 
vulnerability. 
Another body of power that was slipping away from Pinochet’s grip was the 
judiciary. The purchase strength of co-optation with which Pinochet had secured its 
loyalty was declining, especially as Pinochet’s protective power appeared to wane. 
Snyder writes, “A few judges braved the wrath of military regime and the legal 
hierarchy and began to question the established order. In 1977, when the first Amparo 
appeal was finally accepted by the Santiago Appeals Court, a timid minority movement 
within the judiciary began to take shape.”91 Pinochet could no longer depend on 
individual judges to defend his legitimacy against a powerful international public, so to 
secure his chance of a safe exit, the General created the Amnesty Law. In 1978, 
Pinochet created a self-amnesty to legally protect his government and security forces 
from prosecution. Many international observers read this act as a sign of desperation, or 
that Pinochet feared his power was no longer sufficient to support his authority. In other 
words, leaders latch onto impunity when their is plausible suspicion of guilt. The 
Chilean Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law, and the 
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General designed the Senate, mostly appointed, to block any attempts to nullify his 
impunity. 
 
United States 
When Carter became president, Pinochet learned that the president was far less 
inclined to help him skirt around human rights, and was also much less fond of 
Kissinger than had been President Ford. Upon Carter’s arrival at the White House, 
Kissinger – one of Pinochet’s most loyal supporters – promptly left his position as 
Secretary of State. President Carter’s human rights campaign was an unpredictable 
factor that further complicated the junta’s original trust that the US would buffer 
legitimacy of international standing. Now, Pinochet’s most outspoken ally was 
contesting his authority because he either did not seem to have control over his 
intelligence forces, or had consciously authorized the execution of a high-profile 
assassination on foreign soil. 
Not long after the assassination, Senator James Abourezk was quoted in the 
Chicago Tribune to have commented, “The tyranny of the Pinochet government has 
now been extended to Washington.”92 The shock of the event allowed the US to be the 
victim for a brief moment. The Church Committee Report stated: 
When covert actions in Chile became public knowledge, the costs were 
obvious. The United States was seen, by its covert actions, to have 
contradicted not only its official declarations but its treaty commitments 
and principles of long standing. At the same time it was proclaiming a 
‘low profile’ in Latin American relations, the US Government was 
seeking to foment a coup in Chile...there may be costs to pay even if the 
operations could remain secret for long periods of time. Some of these 
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costs may accrue even within the calculus of covert operations: successes 
may turn to failures.93 
 
Found out by investigations and journalistic reportage, the White House had to restore 
its reputation in an ongoing Cold War, and President Carter realized that the way in also 
had to be the way out of deep political scandal. 
Though the idea of continued alliance with Chile was bound to be negative after 
the Letelier assassination, President Carter did not have the intent to break ties with 
Chile. He discovered, however, that speaking to President Pinochet as an offender while 
pledging friendship was exhausting, nebulous, and unpredictable work. The NY Times 
reported, “It would be counterproductive for Washington to rule out an eventual 
rapprochement with Chile or to demand the eventual re-establishment of pre-coup 
conditions. But it would also be a mistake to ease the pressure just as it begins to have 
positive effects. Better to use the present opportunity to extend a modest gain into a 
major one.”94 Noting that opportunity to make gains, Carter wrote assuringly to 
Pinochet when he entered office promising, “You have my assurance that the United 
States will continue in its commitment to world peace and the strengthening of 
international cooperation. I want to strengthen the ties of friendship between the people 
of your country and ours. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.”95 
Later in 1977, Pinochet traveled to Washington to witness the signing of the 
Panama Canal Treaties, and there engaged in conversation with President Carter. 
Perhaps uncomfortably for President Carter, the General defended his actions and 
                                               
93 US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
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complained that his international critics were not appreciating the progress in human 
rights that his regime had made. The bilateral record of their conversation shows: 
Pinochet made the following points...Chile had passed through a difficult 
period during which the Marxist-Leninist government had no respect for 
human rights. Under the Unidad Popular regime citizens were being 
murdered in broad daylight and the military coup was designed precisely 
to preserve human rights...In the beginning there clearly were abuses - 
abuses on both sides. Whenever a soldier was killed, the world reacted 
with silence; when a revolutionary was killed, there was a great hue and 
cry...Finally, Pinochet said he was a great admirer of democracy and it 
was his fondest wish to leave office having built one, but not one liable 
to attack from underneath as had happened before.96 
 
The positive effects of President Carter’s pressure were ambiguous, but it certainly did 
not inhibit Pinochet from practicing the same repression, just on a smaller scale.97 In 
response to General Pinochet’s defense of linear human rights progress, President 
Carter was polite, assuring that strengthening the traditional US-Chilean friendship was 
of utmost concern to his government. If Pinochet experienced any duress, he did not 
demonstrate any in front of his American counterpart. “[Pinochet] did not want to end 
the state of siege immediately upon his return from Washington because it would leave 
him open to charges that he was giving into the pressures from the U.S.”98 
In fact, Carter’s legitimacy quite possibly took more of a toll than that of 
Pinochet, even though the latter had dared to show up in a jurisdiction that his security 
                                               
96 White House, Memorandum of Conversation. “President Pinochet-Carter Bilateral.” September 6, 
1977. 
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forces had recently violated. US news sources criticized Carter for negotiating instead 
of reproving Pinochet. The NY Times made note of the way Carter repeatedly omitted 
the Chilean case - one of the most “egregious” cases in the world - from his Presidential 
statements on human rights. “Some Chilean expatriates think that both the Kissinger 
and Carter statements helped moved General Pinochet into a ‘new phase’ of 
repression…”99 Carter pushed Pinochet to let go of his claim that, even though Chile 
was a UN member nation that signed the charter, “‘mistreatment of its citizens [was] 
solely its own business.’”100 However, Pinochet did not bend easily to pressure, as he 
recognized that the legitimacy of his right to rule was in a much more fragile situation 
than his US counterpart. 
On December 21, 1977, Pinochet called a full national referendum “so that 
every inhabitant of Chile...could decide in his own secret conscience...whether he 
supported the President of the Republic in defending the dignity of Chile and reaffirmed 
the legitimacy of the Government in acting with sovereignty over our institutional 
process or whether, on the contrary, he supported the United Nations resolution and its 
attempt to impose our future destiny on us from abroad.”101 According to Pinochet, 
more than 5.5 million people participated in the polls, and an astounding 4.2 million 
voted in favor of the General’s government. He assured President Carter that over 1 
million had the opportunity to express dissent.102 Pinochet expressed, emphasizing his 
mandate and imperative: 
                                               
99 Such criticism was politically embarrassing to Carter, since the NY Times regularly suggested that 
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My Government is not gloating over this triumph, but neither can it 
ignore it. It is a clear and unmistakable mandate which redoubles the 
moral imperative to carry on until we have fully overcome the totally 
abnormal situation which provoked the foreign interference by an 
imperialist ideology which lasted until September 11, 1973. This result 
furthermore constitutes a categorical denial of the many false and unjust 
images of our reality…[This does] in no way diminish or defer my 
Government’s concern for the safeguarding and promotion of human 
rights.103 
 
Pinochet knew the human rights advocates of the world were his morals into question 
along with his right to solve Chile’s problems, but the General was determined to 
defend his intentions and methods, even if it came with the risk and the cost of lifting 
some repression. 
The US president likewise felt the tension of helping another leader solve his 
country’s problems. Carter’s dilemma was the need to argue for the common goals that 
the US and Chile shared beyond their historic ties alone. According to Walker, “In 
Chile the Carter administration sought a path that balanced between distancing the US 
government from the dictatorship, maintaining pressure on the military leadership to 
improve human rights, and avoiding overt interference in internal affairs that would 
prompt a nationalist backlash.”104 Pinochet, on the other hand, had to respond to many 
Chileans whose anti-imperialist attitudes had not died with Allende. He sought a path 
that would extend between political autonomy and the tension of allying with a country 
that was simultaneously his most powerful ally and the most influential critic of his 
repression. 
                                                                                                                                         
according to its plans for harmonizing freedom with security...Our conviction [is] that human rights 
cannot survive in a society that freely allows totalitarian actions or terrorist violence, since these entail the 
trampling or disregard of all human rights, freedoms, or dignity, [which] is very deep because it flows 
from recent experience in Chile and from a reality which we view with concern in other countries.” 
103 Department of State Memorandum. “Chilean President Pinochet’s Letter to Carter.” March 3, 1978. 
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Within Chile, it was critical for Pinochet to legitimize his continued rule as that 
which could still serve his people’s needs better than any politicians could.105 
Pinochet’s posture toward Carter was assertive and recriminating. On January 30, 1978 
the General wrote to President Carter: 
I can only point out that both my Government and the people of Chile 
were profoundly affected by the United States attitude toward the case of 
Chile in the United Nations. In the first place it should be stressed that 
your Government sponsored the resolution and did so, moreover, in close 
union with countries such as Cuba whose political philosophy and 
practice fragrantly ignore and violate the legal and moral order which 
promotes and safeguards human rights...special consideration was given 
to the serious attempt...to disassociate the people of Chile from their 
Government by making it appear that a majority of them were allied with 
international pressure to direct the course of our history.106 
 
Pinochet rhetorically grouped the US with the UN, which had condemned his regime 
from the outset. The manner of his language reflected an “us” versus “them” tone that 
once again, made his government appear to be a misunderstood enemy. He asserted that 
the Cold War world was failing to recall his pro-democracy ends. It was countries such 
as Cuba that deserved disdain, not his own. 
 
International 
In 1976, the United Nations Economic and Social Council wrote a resolution 
that expressed that it was “gravely worried about the human rights violations that, 
according to the report, occurred in Chile, especially those that entail threats to life and 
human liberty...We urge the Chilean government to take all necessary measures in order 
to reestablish and safeguard basic human rights and the fundamental liberties of 
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Chile…”107 From authoritative statements such as these, the US could not ignore that 
the world was paying more attention to the situation in Chile, and willing to pay far less 
to aid the country. Such scrutiny was exactly the reason why the US side of activities 
had been intentionally covert. 
A member of Santiago Embassy Political section is here...His report on 
Embassy relations with the Junta is most disturbing. He says...The Junta 
does not get clear signals on USG’s Chile policy. They note our votes in 
OAS and U.N., read your speeches, etc., but also see us pushing the Hill 
hard on behalf of help for Chile. The USG Executive branch comes 
through a pro-Junta, trying to deal with the Hill and public opinion in the 
Junta’s interests...CIA and DOD are strongly pro-Junta...The majority of 
the Country Team accept the utility of sanctions to move the Junta more 
quickly toward a position acceptable to Chilean domestic opinion and 
reasonable international critics...There is no viable alternative to the 
Junta. It would be a political disaster if it fell. Pinochet can be 
influenced, if reached. But clear signals are essential.108 
 
The report signals at a more vigorous Pinochet who began claiming legitimacy more 
assertively, realizing that he was the US government’s best, or only, option. Indeed, it 
was disturbing for the US government to realize that Chile was heading one way, 
looking for its guidance less and less frequently, that this would be the regime. 
As the decade drew to a close, the UN, the OAS, and political leaders on 
Pinochet’s back were still collectively challenging the integrity of the Chilean Armed 
Forces. Although he had reduced the number of Gross Human Rights Violations cases 
from 142 in 1976 to 43 in 1977 and 15 in 1978, 72% of the UN General Assembly 
condemned his government in 1976, compared to just a slight drop to 71% in 1977, and 
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68% in 1978.109 Though the shifts in condemnation were modest but on the downturn, 
so did approval simultaneously decline. In 1976, 9% of the United Nations General 
Assembly showed approval toward his government; in 1977 that rose to 10.5%, but 
proceeded to drop dramatically in 1978 to 5% and 4.5% in 1979. 
Pinochet recognized that though he reduced repression, the longevity and 
stability of his power were uncertain, as long as the majority of countries in the world 
voted so invariably against his regime. The General realized that he had to make even 
deeper changes to preserve and extend legitimacy, so he initiated preparations for a new 
constitution. A couple years before Pinochet created Chile’s constitution, de Onis wrote 
in the NY Times, “After the President held a plebiscite in January asking the voters to 
support him against a United Nations resolution condemning violations of human rights 
alleged here, he said he had received a mandate to ‘lead the process of 
institutionalization.’”110 The plebiscite, regardless of the truthfulness of its statistics, 
demonstrated that the president was maintaining power through civic confirmation, and 
not force alone. He claimed to act upon a mandate, and whether or not the assent 
expressed was a rubber stamp or valid presidential prerogative, Pinochet made certain 
he would integrate the legacy of his military intervention into the national legal 
framework. 
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Constitution of 1980 
One of the most significant developments of the end of the 1970s was the junta’s 
preparation for a new Constitution. They started years before, which sustained 
Pinochet’s “not yet” signals to Chileans and international skeptics looking for evidence 
of democratization. The National Foreign Assessment Center wrote on September 28, 
1978 about Pinochet’s speech celebrating the coming Constitution that would transition 
the military government to civilian rule over at least six years. The Center’s Latin 
American Review noted, “As he has in the past, he defended the legitimacy of the coup 
and the moral mandate of the military regime, reviewed its progress, highly praised its 
economic performance, and covered a wide range of domestic and international 
issues…All in all, it was a strongly worded defense of his embattled regime in its 
continuing struggle against the forces and ideologies allegedly manifested in the 
overthrown Allende administration.”111 The article went on to note that Pinochet’s 
speech addressed the still present domestic forces that he warned desired to “annihilate 
forever the basic principles of Chilean nationality.” Though his statements evidently 
addressed Chileans, he directed them toward international community as well, which in 
1978, was still wary of the General’s audacity. Another Latin American Review article 
reported, “For the majority who still support Pinochet, however, the only way to 
preserve the accomplishments of the military regime is to keep him in power. Although 
they have little else in common…Contreras and Pinochet will be condemned anew by 
the world media.”112 As a result, Pinochet would face a tarnished international 
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reputation, which would make little sense were he to preserve his accomplishments and 
remain in power. 
On the anniversary of the coup d’état in the year 1980, President Pinochet held a 
referendum to approve the replacement of the Chilean constitution. Not shockingly, the 
junta nominated Pinochet to be president of the republic, who was approved to serve an 
eight-year term.113 According to the National Observer Election Association, just over 
two-thirds of the Chilean citizenry voted “yes” for the new constitution, though 
Pinochet faced wide accusations of electoral fraud. According to the NY Times, Chilean 
voters were expectant of electoral fraud, and feared that inspections of “no” ballots 
would lead to loss of employment. De Onis described how Chilean newspapers 
promoted the new Constitution through advertisements that “prey[ed] on the average 
citizen’s fear of social turmoil.”114 Curiously enough, the word “democracy” appeared 
only once in the new Constitution, whereas “national security” appeared twelve times 
and “public order” ten times.115 The new Chilean democracy was to be founded in part 
upon a value for national security, which reinforced the importance of the Armed 
Forces and validated their role as protectors of a constitutional principle. 
Doubts about electoral fraud aside, the government of Chile successfully 
inaugurated the new constitution and greatly expanded executive powers. Though the 
Constitution seemed to mark the culmination of the restructuring process, the promised 
democracy was not yet ready. De Onis wrote in the NY Times, “[Pinochet] added, 
however, that there would not be any election for 10 years and indicated that he felt that 
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the 75 percent vote against the United Nations action was personal backing for him to 
remain in the presidency at will.”116 First of all, the government announced it would be 
transitioning from a military government to a regular democracy. The Constitution 
became Pinochet’s new long-term tool of legitimization, which institutionalized a 
political culture and structure incompatible with communism. 
The wording of the document reflected the changes in the Cold War paradigm, 
in that ideological biases were more nuanced and democratic favor was much more vital 
to the constitution. Pinochet framed the Constitution to provoke a nationalistic reaction, 
deliberately using language that resonated traditional Chilean values of democracy. The 
opening lines of the Constitution read, “That the national sovereign will, expressed by 
the majority in a free, secret and informed action, was pronounced approving the 
proposed Constitution.”117 The constitution reopened congress, which was to be filled 
first by appointed congressmen and later by elections. This was a significant change 
from the four-man junta that had exercised legislative powers until that point, who now 
appeared to have fulfilled their original intentions of reestablishing democracy. Instead, 
Pinochet transferred authority to national institutions, but centralized and wielded it in 
his own executive seat with great control. 
The Constitution became Pinochet’s new long-term tool of legitimacy, which 
institutionalized a political culture and structure incompatible with communism. The 
Constitution also marked the turning point in which he regimented his prior struggle for 
political survival into a new system rules for access to power and control over the State. 
Snyder writes of the Constitution, “The powers conveyed on the Executive by the new 
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constitution were so sweeping [and] the citizen’s recourse against them so minimal” 
that Pinochet, the author of this system and its ideals, could still claim exceptions to a 
constitution that had been born out of “war.”118 
Curiously enough in the new constitution, the word “democracy” appeared only 
once, whereas “national security” appeared twelve times and “public order” ten times. 
The new Chilean democracy was to be founded in part upon a value for security, which 
reinforced the importance of the Armed Forces and validated its role as protector of a 
constitutional principle. Article 22 of the Constitution preserved national security as an 
official national principle: “Chileans have the fundamental duty to honor their 
fatherland, defend its sovereignty and contribute to the preservation of national security 
and the essential values of the Chilean tradition.”119 According to this sentiment, the 
government upheld that individuals bore responsibility for helping it do its job, while 
those who rejected this function could be considered liabilities or threats to the 
collective spirit that defended sovereignty. 
By 1980, Pinochet still framed Marxists as one of the most dangerous threats to 
the society, but the institutions of the nation would safeguard the people from such 
infiltration. The eighth article of the Constitution demonstrated that Chile integrated this 
understanding, even though it refrained from explicitly calling out any ideologies by 
name. For example, Article 8 stated, “Any action by an individual or group intended to 
propagate doctrines attempting against the family, or which advocate violence or a 
concept of society, the State or the juridical order, of a totalitarian character or based on 
class warfare, is illegal and contrary to the institutional code, of the Republic.” As the 
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NY Times forewarned in 1978, the enforcement of the constitution seemed to be 
transpiring in a “political vacuum,” in which Pinochet’s main competition was still 
essentially banned and dissenters could expect punishment.120 This investigation 
concludes at 1980, but the author believes it befitting to end this section reflecting that 
Pinochet’s Constitution would prefigure actual democratic transformation in Chile. It 
would still be years before Chilean citizens would see their political and civil rights 
more fully returned; however, as former diplomat Robert Gelbard commented, “If 
leaders come to use the form of democracy, publics come to expect the substance.”121  
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Conclusion 
This investigation has analyzed the National Security Archives, diplomatic 
communications of Pinochet and his US presidential counterparts, and public 
discourses, and a variety of other primary sources from the 1970s. The early years of 
the regime required Pinochet to depend on external legitimacy while he was proving his 
government’s worth to a nation that he just shocked with a violent intervention. The 
authoritarian leader successfully depoliticized the organized sectors of the citizenry, but 
the narrative of communist danger to Chilean society was all the while less and less 
credible. When Pinochet’s confidence in the prerogative to repress became 
overextended and alarmed the United States, he adjusted his methods of rule. 
International scrutiny brought Pinochet to a struggle for political survival, upon which 
he institutionalized safeguards and began to carve his way out of a trap of illegitimacy. 
The general bargained with a world that demanded recognition and respect of human 
rights, reducing his repression while instituting measures to make the people believe in 
his system. 
Pinochet attempted to strengthen his legitimacy as he rationalized that more 
force elicited more compliance, whereas less force elicited more legitimacy. However, 
the decade neared to an end, and the international reaction to his adjustments surprised 
his expectations. The growing disaffection of the US toward Chile was becoming 
increasingly noticeable, and though he pressured President Carter in public and in 
private, he could not win the hearts and minds of the international public. The Letelier 
assassination and expansion of international consciousness about his violence pushed 
Pinochet to prove his mandate through a citizenry that chose to legitimize him. After his 
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first couple years of rule, he had crossed a threshold with human rights that he could no 
longer appease through withdrawal of repression. He released political prisoners, he 
drew back on torture, and he invited exiles to return, all to the effect that backlash did 
not recede. 
Pinochet’s institutionalization and centralization of power reflected his need to 
safeguard his image and his policies. The Amnesty Law symbolized his victim 
narrative, in which he blamed the world for misunderstanding his initiatives. In the end, 
his legal safeguards could not prevent that the world had branded him a dictator. He 
portrayed himself as the misunderstood hero and institutionalized his vision for the 
framework for the country. 
As for the US, President Carter did not send very explicit messages in their 
private correspondences to coerce or persuade Pinochet. Nevertheless, disapproving 
international opinion was enough to make Pinochet recognize that force was no longer a 
viable method to legitimize his regime. As a result, the world demanded he seek more 
democratic alternatives to stabilize his regime, and he consented, even if it was a 
“glacial” transition out of the system of military rule.122 This study has pieced together a 
narrative of how the changing international perceptions indeed influenced the retention, 
deterioration, and adaptation of Pinochet’s legitimacy. The General pushed through the 
higher standards for claim to democratic rule, though the world never accepted him as 
anything but authoritarian. Perhaps Pinochet died believing he won out over human 
rights, but try as he might to justify his violence, he was never able to redeem his image 
as an enemy of human rights.  
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